In Racial Prescriptions, Jonathan Xavier Inda offers a critical and timely analysis of the making of BiDil, the first (and only) drug that was marketed exclusively to African Americans. Sibille Merz speaks to him about the re-articulation of racial politics under neoliberalism, the legacies of scientific racism and the molecularization of biopolitics in the genomic age.

Esse artigo tem como objetivo contribuir para o debate sobre a privatização do ensino no Brasil desde os anos 60 até o período de redemocratização em 1988. Com os debates sobre a educaçãosendo travados em diversos momentos históricos, a diferença entre as frentes únicas formadas, seja do lado do ensino público como do privado serão demonstradas. A Campanha em defesa da escola pública no processo de tramitação da LDBEN aprovada em 1961, o golpe militar e sua reformas assim como o (...) período da reabertura democrática foram momentos de intensas disputas pela educação nacional, onde diversos sujeitos se articulavam para defender seus interesses. Não limitamos aqui a análise a apenas dois blocos homogêneos, mas tentamos demostrar as articulações entre os intelectuais, pontuando suas diferenças mais marcantes e o esforço para se tornar hegemônicos na educação nacional. (shrink)

The work of the lay Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain continues to provoke and inspire readers to engage in a Thomistic approach to many of the questions facing the world today. Maritain’s wide-ranging thought touched on many fields, including aesthetics, anthropology, educational theory, moral philosophy, and ethics, as well as Thomism and its relationship to other philosophical stances._ In _Being in the World: A Quotable Maritain Reader_, Mario O. D’Souza, C.S.B., has selected seven hundred and fifty of the most salient quotations (...) found in the English translations of fifty-four works by Jacques Maritain. Organized into forty thematic chapters, ordered alphabetically, the book serves as an overview of the areas that Maritain's writings addressed. By referring to entries in _Being in the World_, readers can quickly locate key passages in Maritain’s writing on a given topic and then turn elsewhere to the full texts for more in-depth study. Complete with a detailed index of key terms, the _Reader _will be an essential reference tool for the study of Maritain in English. "Fr. Mario O. D'Souza's careful selection from the works of Jacques Maritain provides the reader with an invaluable sampling of Maritain's extensive philosophical work. In it, we find examples of Maritain's almost lyrical gift of expression as well as of his trenchant wit. More than a scholarly contribution, the volume also ably serves as an introduction and entrance into Maritain's corpus." — William Sweet, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada_. (shrink)

Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.

We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they (...) believe to be false. We cannot trust the liar at all. (shrink)

Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference (...) to the subjective reasons account of rationality. The second half suggest that this point may have been missed because of certain similarities between the subjective reasons account and the importantly different transparency account. On the transparency account, rationality seems not to be normative. I think it is often assumed that what goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reasons account as well. But I argue that this is a mistake. A corollary is that the subjective reasons account has an important advantage over the transparency account, given how plausible it is that rationality is normative. (shrink)

Green offers us two options: either connectionist models are literal models of brain activity or they are mere instruments, with little or no ontological significance. According to Green, only the first option renders connectionist models genuinely explanatory. I think there is a third possibility. Connectionist models are not literal models of brain activity, but neither are they mere instruments. They are abstract, IDEALISED models of the brain that are capable of providing genuine explanations of cognitive phenomena.

The English Civil War brought an end to government censorship of nonconformist texts. The resulting exegetical and hermeneutical battles waged over baptism among paedobaptists and Baptists continued well into the Restoration period. A survey of the post-Restoration polemical literature reveals the following themes: 1) the polemical ‘slippery slope’ is a major feature of these tracts. Dissenting paedobaptists believed that Baptists would inevitably become Quakers, despising baptism altogether, and that the resulting social instability would allow the tyranny of Roman Catholicism to (...) reemerge in England. Baptists for their part compared the tyranny of paedobaptist argumentation to the tyranny exercised by Roman Catholics. Anti- Quakeriana and Anti-Popery were both central ‘devil terms’ in this polemical warfare; 2) the exegesis of biblical texts underlying infant baptism revealed contrary understandings of how the bible fit together as a whole. Baptists tended to read Old and New Testaments disjunctively, whereas paedobaptists saw continuity absent explicit abrogation; 3) scholastic theology continued to undergird the arguments of all parties. Especially relevant to this discussion was debate over the proper ‘matter’ and ‘form’ of baptism. Here exegetical and hermeneutical disputes were also relevant. This study reveals that patterns of reading Scripture in each community were informed by traditions and practices, and that the search for the objective ‘literal’ sense of the text was bound to be unavailing. (shrink)

Commitment to a pattern of altruism or self-control may indeed be learnable and sometimes rational. Commitment may also result from illusions. In one illusion, people think that their present behavior causes their future behavior, or causes the behavior of others, when really only correlation is present. Another happy illusion is that morality and self-interest coincide, so that altruism appears self-interested.

Gomer and his stuffed dog, Little Gomer, are inseparable. When Gomer goes to the park to play with the other dogs, he holds on tight to his friend, even though he can't run as fast as he wants or romp the way the other dogs do. But when it's time to play fetch with the dog walker, Gomer sets Little Gomer down so that he can carry the fetch stick home-and leaves Little Gomer behind. How can Gomer survive without his (...) friend? Bright and cheerful illustrations punctuate this sweet story about the bond between a dog and his toy. (shrink)

Shortly after the Vandals took Carthage in 439, the city's Catholic bishop, Quodvultdeus, and a large number of his clergy were said to have been placed “naked and despoiled on broken ships” and put to sea, banished from Africa. By God's mercy, the exiles made their way safely to Naples, where Quodvultdeus quickly came to be regarded as a saint: a fifth-century mosaic from the catacombs of St. Januarius in Capodimonte seems to depict the African bishop, and by the middle (...) of the ninth century his feast day was celebrated in the local liturgical calendar. A similar story could be told of Gaudiosus of Abitina, another fifth-century African bishop who was said to have fled the Vandals and who also achieved sainthood in Campania. The flight of refugees like Quodvultdeus and Gaudiosus from the political turmoil that wracked North Africa between the fifth and the eighth centuries, however, has long been seen as having a far greater significance than the reinvention of exiled African bishops as southern Italian holy men. In late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, the cults of numerous saints who had been martyred in Africa and whose cults had originally developed there spread beyond the shores of the southern Mediterranean to the rest of the Christian world. In seeking to explain the diffusion of these cults, historians have long focused on the movements of refugees—and, above all, those who fled the Vandals' conquest of Africa and their subsequent persecution of the region's Catholic population—as displaced Africans such as Quodvultdeus are thought to have brought the relics of their local saints with them into foreign exile. (shrink)

Jon Jacobs emphasises their distinctive contributions, emphasises the shared rational emphasis of their approach to Torah, and draws out resonances with ...

The notions of autonomy and self-governance each capture something crucial about the moral dimensions of agents and actions. These notions are central to the ways in which we conceptualize ourselves and others. The concept of autonomy is especially crucial to understanding the distinct status of moral agents. For its part, self-governance has a significant relation to the evaluation of agents as individuals with particular characters, leading particular sorts of lives, and performing particular actions. Neither notion—autonomy nor self-governance—fully assimilates or dominates (...) the other. Moreover, there are some important strains between them. There are certain forms of regard that the autonomy of an agent demands that are at odds with what an agent's exercise of self-governance merits. In this essay I plan to show this, and offer a diagnosis of why this is the case. (shrink)

I seek to show that we do not need norms in a genuinely naturalistic epistemology. The argumentation is launched against a common conception of such norms as derived through a process of wide reflective equilibrium, where one aims to bring general normative statements into accord with concrete, possibly expert, intuitions about particular cases, taking simultaneously into account relevant scientific findings -- including facts about human psychological abilities -- and philosophical theories. According to this line, it is possible thus to arrive (...) at genuine, general normative statements concerning how we should reason. I maintain that such statements are superfluous or illegitimate for several interlocking reasons. The central arguments are i) that certain norms simply repeat the content of descriptive statements which in any case would have to be taken account of in scientific reasoning; ii) if norms are merely meant to systematize an intuitive capacity for reasoning and forming beliefs, we can make do with honing that capacity; iii) there is no reason to regard principles in a psychological reasoning module as norms rather than simply prescursors of behaviour; iv) we cannot make sense of experts in relation to epistemic rationality; v) making play with the idea of purely philosophical constraints on theories of norms involves reneging on naturalism. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. An individual's behaviour is governed not by a set of ‘global’ traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situational feature, they argue, but by a much larger array of ‘local’ traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features. But the data cited by these philosophers support their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the more (...) traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. We should not adopt the former conception, moreover, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which we need a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should not revise our understanding of character in the way proposed. (shrink)

Time flows. This oft-lamented fact of human existence seems plain enough, but is remarkably difficult to explain scientifically. Physical theory follows a greater goal—symmetry—and the directional nature of time is left adrift. The phenomenon must nevertheless be explained.Scientists since Isaac Newton have searched classical mechanics for answers, but precious little progress has been made on his mystical ideas. The discoveries of thermodynamics, though clearly relevant, have posed more problems than they have solved.Now a new solution presents itself through quantum mechanics. (...) The intimate relation between thermodynamics and time is not in doubt, but now quantum theory is explaining how the laws of entropy arise from a stranger reality. The theory of decoherence begins to explain time as a holistic quantum concept. (shrink)

This paper examines the intricate relationship between De Senectute and the Second Philippic, arguing that De Senectute is an important lens through which to read the Second Philippic. When Cicero decided on irrevocable opposition to Antony, the moral and political theorizing about the role of senes (literally, ‘old men/elders’) in the state found in De Senectute provided a convenient and topical framework for synthesizing the invective of the Second Philippic. A close reading of De Senectute with the Second Philippic demonstrates (...) that the philosophical thinking of De Senectute informed Cicero’s political persona in the Second Philippic and establishes the Second Philippic as the intellectual successor to De Senectute. (shrink)

Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they hardly (...) feel their bodies . They can initiate movements, and with the help of visual feedback learn to control them. It is shown that the traditional view of the self as immaterial is not supported by these cases. But the argument against this view has to be amended. It relies too much on bodily sensations, and misses the importance of active self-movement. (shrink)

In the last few years, an understanding has emerged of the developmental mechanism for the consistent internal left–right structure, termed situs, that characterises vertebrate anatomy. This involves largely vertebrate‐conserved (i.e. ‘phylotypic’) gene expression cascades that encode ‘leftness’ and ‘rightness’ in appropriate tissues either side of the embryo's midline soon after gastrulation. Recent evidence indicates that the initial, directional symmetry breaking that initiates these cascades utilises mechanisms that are conserved or at least closely related in different vertebrate types. I describe a (...) scenario whereby the capacity for directional modification of an otherwise bilateral body plan can be viewed as an adaptive innovation rather closely connected with vertebrate origins, enabling optimal ‘design’ for very active lifestyles. But an alternative scenario, while retaining the view that situs and indeed other vertebrate functional lateralisations are deeply adaptive, proposes that they originated in the co‐optation of left–right developmental information inherited from a very early stage in metazoan diversification. It is proposed that a remote chordate ancestor lost its original or ‘ur‐bilaterian’ symmetry to pass through an altogether non‐symmetrical stage, and that the vertebrate dorsoventral midline plane is not descended from that original one. I review the considerable evidence in favour of this scenario, and discuss its wider implications for directional asymmetries across the Metazoa. BioEssays 26:413–421, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Cyril of Alexandria was a prolific biblical commentator who underscored the meaning and relevance of the Old Testament for Christian theology by employing a typological method of interpretation. His exegetical concern was to demonstrate that everything associated with the old covenant- people, events, commandments, institutions-were types and shadows foretelling the ‘mystery of Christ’. The key to understanding the types of the Old Testament is to recognize their soteriological fulfillment in the person and work of Jesus Christ. Throughout his exegetical writings, (...) Cyril draws particular attention to the Jewish rite of circumcision, showing how the physical operation signifies the saving work of Christ through the Spirit. Cyril does not interpret circumcision in a monolithic sense, but derives multiple soteriological meanings from it. Insofar as circumcision represents a variety of saving realities for Cyril, it helps us understand his complex, multi-faceted doctrine of salvation. (shrink)

The psycho-historical framework proposes that appreciators' responses to art vary as a function of their sensitivity to its historical dimensions. However, the explanatory power of that framework is limited insofar as it assimilates relevantly different kinds of appreciation and insofar as it eschews a normative account of when a response succeeds in qualifying as an appreciation of art qua art.

A ‘crisis’ is defined as a situation in which if a person does not do something atrocious there will ensue a state of affairs that is even worse. This chapter discusses Anscombe's absolutism about atrocities, and the near‐absolutism of Fried and Williams, and, more sympathetically, Hampshire's view that absolutism ought to be adopted as a policy though not defended as a theory. Issues about atrocity and moral character, about the relevance of an atrocity's involving other agents as well, and about (...) Williams's concept of ‘projects’, are discussed. An account is given of the real conceptual structure that is at work in moralities known as ‘deontological’. (shrink)

Michael Clark has recently argued that the slippery slope argument against voluntary euthanasia is ‘entirely consequentialist’ and that its use to justify continued prohibition of voluntary euthanasia involves a failure to treat patients who request assistance in ending their lives as ends in themselves. This article agues that in fact the slippery slope is consistent with most forms of deontology, and that it need not involve any violation of the principle that people should be treated as ends, depending upon how (...) that principle is construed. It is concluded that supporters of voluntary euthanasia cannot dismiss the slippery slope argument on the basis of deontological principles but must take seriously the consequences that it postulates and engage in factual argument about their likely extent and about the likely effectiveness of any proposed safeguards. (shrink)